Finding “Win-Win” China’s Arctic Policy and what it means for Canada by Lajeunesse, Adam
www.policyschool.ca
PUBLICATIONS
SPP Briefing Paper
Volume 11:33   December 2018
http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v11i0.43480
FINDING “WIN-WIN”  
CHINA’S ARCTIC POLICY AND  
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Adam Lajeunesse
SUMMARY 
China is a “Near Arctic State” with national interests in Arctic resources, shipping 
lanes, and regional governance. That was the message delivered to the world in 
China’s new Arctic policy (China 2018). The philosophy espoused in the Chinese White 
Paper is one of cooperation and mutual profit – what the Chinese have dubbed “win-
win” polar partnerships. These partnerships have been expanding in recent years. 
Tens of billions of dollars in Chinese capital has flowed into oil and gas projects in 
Siberia and the Russian Arctic offshore, new shipping routes are being tested, and 
state-owned mining companies have acquired rich mineral deposits in Greenland 
and – to a lesser extent – Canada. These resources, and the sea lanes that connect 
them, have been labelled the “Polar Silk Road,” a maritime trade and shipping route 
supported by Chinese infrastructure spending (theoretically) running through the 
Northwest Passage and other circumpolar channels. China’s increasingly confident 
posture in the North represents real opportunities – and challenges – for Canada. 
Managed properly, Chinese money can support the decades old Canadian dream 
of developing the Northwest Passage as a useable sea route, decreasing shipping 
costs, supporting development and improving the quality of life for Arctic residents. 
Managed incorrectly, Chinese activity might leave the Asian power with a degree of 
de facto control over the Arctic, damaging Canadian sovereignty and imperiling the 
country’s ability to manage this increasingly important region on Canadian terms. 
This new White Paper is as clear a signal as can be sent that China is coming into the 
Arctic with long-term strategic ambitions. Canada should not fear this development, 
but it must be prepared for it.
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1On January 26, 2018, China’s vice-minister of foreign affairs, Kong Xuanyou, unveiled his 
country’s new policy for the circumpolar Arctic, simply titled: China’s Arctic Policy. This 
document marks an important milestone in China’s engagement with the North. It is the first 
ever white paper issued by Beijing on a region outside its own territory (Brady 2017) and 
signals a long-term commitment to working with Arctic powers and contributing to a rapidly 
changing Arctic. A comprehensive document, the white paper outlines a broad series of 
Chinese national interests, many of which build upon years of official public statements and 
academic discussion (Lackenbauer et. al. 2017, 27-39). 
Understanding this policy and its implications for the North should be a priority for Canadian 
policy-makers. As climate change reduces the Arctic ice cover and provides new incentives 
for shipping and development, non-Arctic states will play an increasingly important role in the 
region. Given its economic clout and its position as a global trading power and consumer of 
vast quantities of imported natural resources, China will be the most important of these new 
Arctic actors. In recognition of this, this paper breaks down the critical elements of Chinese 
policy and what they mean for Canada.
While China’s Arctic Policy is a wide-ranging document, it predictably focuses on four key 
areas: shipping, resource development, regional governance and science. These are all subjects 
linked to Chinese trade and development and have been frequently highlighted by Chinese 
scholars and government representatives over the past several years as representing Chinese 
national interests (Zhang 2015). Underlying these specific priorities is an ever-present and 
overarching theme of respect and participation: respect for China’s interests in the Arctic and for 
the involvement of non-Arctic states in the region’s development and governance. The message 
to Canada and the other Arctic states is clear: China perceives a real interest in Arctic activity, it 
intends to play a role in the region and it expects to be treated as a partner in those activities.
China’s expectation that it will be treated as a partner in the Arctic, and not simply an 
interloper, stems not simply from policy pronouncements (which many other states have also 
made), but from the resources it has put — and is putting — into Arctic capabilities, all of 
which denote a seriousness of purpose and long-term intent. The Chinese icebreaker Xue 
Long has now undertaken eight Arctic expeditions and will soon be joined by a second heavy 
icebreaker.1 While most of this activity has been in the Russian Arctic or Polar Basin, the ship 
made headlines in 2017 by transiting the Northwest Passage (Fife and Chase 2017). Chinese 
shipping and resource companies are, meanwhile, increasingly invested in Arctic shipping 
routes and northern mineral and hydrocarbon resources. Chinese state-owned enterprises have 
invested tens of billions of dollars into Siberian and Russian Arctic offshore oil and natural gas 
fields, Greenlandic mines and related shipping infrastructure (Lackenbauer et. al. 2017, 116-118; 
Connelly 2018, 6). Projects in Canada are far less advanced, but Chinese state-owned mining 
companies have stakes in a number of potentially enormous developments, such as MMG’s 
Izok Lake and High Lake projects in Nunavut (Lackenbauer et. al. 2017, 104-05). Linking these 
investments together is the new “Polar Silk Road” concept laid out in the white paper. This 
vague but ambitious initiative encourages Chinese companies to work with Arctic states to 
develop circumpolar shipping routes through new infrastructure investments and commercial 
trial voyages.
Whether this presence and activity is something to be feared or cautiously welcomed remains 
a point of contention. Scholars such as Ann-Marie Brady and Rob Huebert point to the threat 
1 Snow Dragon 2 was launched in December 2017.
2created by recent Chinese military excursions to the North, as well as the potentially coercive 
leverage that large-scale investment might convey to Beijing (Brady 2017, 1-2; Thomson 2018; 
CBC Radio 2017). A competing school of thought, laid out in a recent book by this author and 
several colleagues assumes that this threat has been overblown and that China has the potential 
to contribute to northern development and regional co-operation (Lackenbauer et. al. 2017).
China’s Arctic Policy seems to support the latter interpretation: that the country is not a 
direct threat to Arctic-state interests and that mutually productive activity is possible. Indeed, 
the values espoused in the Chinese document — environmental preservation, co-operation, 
consultation, support for Indigenous communities and science-based policy-making — strike 
many of the same chords as Canadian policy under the Liberal party. China, proclaims the 
policy, seeks to “safeguard and promote peace and stability in, and the sustainable development 
of, the Arctic.” In the process, Beijing pledges to “protect (the Arctic’s) unique natural 
environment and ecological system, promote its own climatic, environmental and ecological 
resilience, and respect its diverse social culture and the historical traditions of the indigenous 
peoples.” Support for environmental protection and Indigenous rights litter the document 
in a clear attempt to allay concerns that Chinese participation in the Arctic is something to 
fear. Rather than seeking to radically upset the status quo, China looks to craft “win-win” 
relationships that respect Chinese rights and interests in the region and Arctic-state sovereignty 
and control. 
The natural and essential question is: does this policy represent real Chinese intent or is it a 
smokescreen to lull Canada and other Arctic states into a false sense of security? Diplomacy, 
after all, is sometimes the art of saying “nice doggie” — until you can find a stick.2 That is 
certainly the theory advanced by commentators like Roger Robinson Jr., who has warned of a 
“long con” being played on the West by far-sighted and insidious Chinese planners (Robinson 
2013). As this author — and others — have argued elsewhere, that is almost certainly a 
paranoid overreaction (Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer 2016). It would be fanciful however, to 
take at face value China’s statements that it has a sincere interest in the cultural and economic 
security of Indigenous residents, or a vested interest in regional environmental preservation. 
The country’s history of oppressing its own minority populations and disregard for its own 
environment makes such assertions difficult to take seriously.3
Whether or not China truly cares about the northern environment, Indigenous rights or 
sustainable development is probably beside the point. What matters is that Canada does. 
China’s Arctic Policy demonstrates a recognition that the country cannot operate in the Arctic 
without Canada and the other Arctic states. All known Arctic resources lie within areas of 
well-defined national jurisdiction, while northern shipping routes will depend on Canadian 
and Russian co-operation. This recognition underlies what is probably the key statement from 
the white paper: that “China will participate in Arctic affairs in accordance with the basic 
principles of respect, co-operation, win-win result and sustainability,” with this “respect” 
assumed to be “reciprocal.” On China’s part, it undertakes to “respect the sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction enjoyed by the Arctic States.” From those states, China 
expects respect for “the rights and freedom of non-Arctic States to carry out activities in this 
2 This saying is variously attributed to Robert Phelps, Francis Rodman and Will Rogers.
3 China’s abuses of its minority populations are well documented. See, for example, details on Chinese human rights 
violations in: Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018. Chinese cities are also some of the most polluted on earth. 
Extensive scholarship exists on this subject. See for instance: Air Pollution in China: Real-Time Air Quality Index Visual 
Map, accessed March 23, 2018, http://aqicn.org/map/china/#@g/29.3156/116.6748/4z.
3region in accordance with the law.” That law is defined within the white paper as encompassing 
the UN Charter, the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and international 
regulations governed by bodies such as the International Maritime Organization. These laws 
apply to many of China’s Arctic interests, such as “scientific research, navigation, overflight, 
fishing, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea 
areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area.”
China is willing to play by these rules primarily because they offer Beijing the essence of what 
it wants from the region: the right to navigate the Arctic waters, fish in the Arctic Basin and 
develop resources outside of Arctic-state jurisdiction (a still-to-be-defined segment of seabed 
called “the Area”). Provided that Arctic states respect China’s legal rights, as defined by these 
treaties and conventions, there is no need for China to upset the status quo or challenge Arctic 
states’ control over the region. Co-operation must, therefore, be the order of the day and China 
is clearly signalling that, because Canada cares so much about environmental preservation 
and Indigenous communities, it will too. This is the implicit quid pro quo that China lays out 
in its new policy and the underlying philosophy behind its “win-win” approach to Arctic co-
operation. It is an arrangement that Canada should be able to live with.
China’s participation in the Canadian Arctic, through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative — or 
other ventures — should be welcomed, but cautiously. Canadian governments have dreamed of 
developing the Arctic since Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s aborted “Roads to Resources” 
program in the 1960s. The continuous failure to build the necessary maritime infrastructure 
and advance the resource projects needed to create jobs and lower the cost of living in the 
region can largely be attributed to the difficulty accessing the region and the high costs of 
Arctic operations — which can be 250-per-cent higher than comparable southern projects 
(Mining Association of Canada et. al. 2015, 6).
Efforts to improve this infrastructure have moved slowly. The National Trade Corridors Fund 
has earmarked money for northern projects (Canada 2017a) and the government of Canada 
is engaged in the inter-departmental, multi-year Northern Marine Transportation Corridors 
initiative to identify and improve Arctic sea routes through charting and infrastructure 
enhancement. A decades-old project to build an all-weather road to Tuktoyaktuk was 
completed in 2017 as well. Still, these initiatives have been limited by a lack of money and any 
pressing, immediate requirements. Chinese capital might be useful in developing Arctic 
infrastructure, provided a clear business model can be established. 
Most importantly, Canada needs ports and harbours in the Arctic, to supply Navy and Coast 
Guard vessels over the lengthening ice-free season and to support resource development and 
commercial shipping (Ruffilli 2011, 6) in an area heavily dependant on sealift (Canada 2018). 
If Chinese companies are serious about using the Northwest Passage, there may be a matching 
interest in investing in new infrastructure. That investment would support local communities 
by lowering the cost of re-supply, while facilitating development activities of other companies 
working in the area. Recently, Arctic scholar Michael Byers has pointed to the crumbling 
facilities at Churchill, Man. as an obvious opportunity to leverage such funding to support 
export shipping and rebuild a northern community (Sevunts 2017).
Arctic resource development would likewise benefit from the deep pockets of Chinese mining 
firms. These companies have invested in the Canadian North before, running or partnering 
in operations in northern Quebec (the Raglan Mine) and Yukon (the Wolverine Mine and the 
Selwyn project). The high price of northern development has limited Chinese enthusiasm 
4in recent years, with some of the larger greenfield sites, like MMG’s massive Izok and High 
Lake projects, left in limbo until conditions improve (Lackenbauer et. al. 2017, 104-05.) A 
sustained and well-funded effort to improve northern shipping, logistics and transportation 
infrastructure might change that equation for companies from around the world looking for an 
underdeveloped, resource-rich area in a stable jurisdiction.
The investment record of Chinese state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) is mixed. Stories of 
environmental degradation and labour strife inevitably generate trepidation (The Economist 
2011); however, SOEs have invested in Canada’s resource sector for years without giving real 
cause for concern.4 Fears of Chinese SOEs importing cheap labour or disregarding Canadian 
laws have proven groundless and speak more to Canada’s insecurity over its ability to impose 
and enforce its own laws than of China’s willingness to violate them (Lackenbauer and 
Manicom 2014, 13). That China’s Arctic Policy explicitly “requires its enterprises to observe 
the laws of the relevant States” in development activities only encourages SOEs to assiduously 
abide by Canadian regulations or risk not only fines and penalties but a loss of face for the 
government in Beijing.
The level of Chinese control over infrastructure in the Arctic should be subject to careful 
review. Given the dearth of access points in the Arctic, many projects would take on a strategic 
dimension. Chinese-SOE control over strategic assets — which the Canadian Navy and Coast 
Guard may come to depend upon — would be unacceptable. On this point it is instructive 
to note Sri Lanka’s recent handover to China of the port of Hambantota. Its sale of a 99-year 
lease to a Chinese company stemmed from Columbo’s failure to cope with its heavy Chinese 
debt (Schultz 2017). Partnerships between Canadian governments or companies and their 
Chinese equivalents should assign minority roles to Chinese investment.5 The means to do so 
are already available in the Investment Canada Act, which strengthened provisions concerning 
SOEs in the wake of CNOOC’s 2013 takeover of Nexen (Dobson 2017, 41-42.)
The most controversial element of China’s growing Arctic presence, and particularly its 
recent activities in Canada, relates to the question of sovereignty. Canada defines the waters 
within the Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters — a status that grants Ottawa the 
power to regulate and control those waters without constraint. The United States and certain 
other maritime powers assume the existence of an international strait through the archipelago 
(Germany 2013; United States 2013; United States 2013a). For decades, this dispute remained 
frozen. With limited shipping and no pressing need to resolve the issue, Canada and the U.S. 
simply agreed to disagree.6 A significant increase in shipping, driven by new Chinese traffic, 
might not only revive the issue but damage Canada’s legal position if that shipping is not 
properly controlled (Pharand 2006, 220–21).
In discussing the Northwest Passage and China’s plans to use Canadian waters, the white paper 
walks a very fine line, stating: 
China respects the legislative, enforcement and adjudicatory powers of the Arctic States in 
the waters subject to their jurisdiction. China maintains that the management of the Arctic 
4 The biggest such investment was China National Offshore Oil Corp.’s purchase of Nexen in 2012. For a detailed list of 
Chinese-SOE investments in Canada’s resource industry see: Wendy Dobson, “China’s State-Owned Enterprises and 
Canada’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy,” Canadian Public Policy 43(2), 38 (2017).
5 Adam MacDonald highlights the need for due diligence and caution toward “strings attached” to such deals in: Adam 
MacDonald, “Ottawa Should be Wary of China’s Visions for the Arctic,” MLI Inside Policy (2018).
6 
This agreement is codified in the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement. 
5shipping routes should be conducted in accordance with treaties including the UNCLOS 
and general international law and that the freedom of navigation enjoyed by all countries 
in accordance with the law and their rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should be 
ensured. China maintains that disputes over the Arctic shipping routes should be properly 
settled in accordance with international law. (italics added)
In this crucial paragraph, the Chinese government states that it respects Canadian sovereignty 
“in the waters subject to [Canada’s] jurisdiction,” without specifying what those areas might be. 
It goes on to say that China “enjoys freedom of navigation” in accordance with UNCLOS — a 
reference to the right of transit passage through international straits, guaranteed in Article 38 of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982). While this phrasing could be 
seen to imply a Chinese assumption of free navigation through the region, there are other ways 
to read that statement. 
Canada has also signed the UN Convention and accepts the rights of transit passage; yet it 
asserts that there is no such right in the Northwest Passage. The final wording of Part III, Article 
8(2) of UNCLOS states that the passage regime would apply to “any areas of internal waters 
within a strait, except where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the 
method set forth in Article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not 
previously been considered as such” (italics added) (United Nations 1982, Article 35). Since, 
however, Canada enclosed the waters before ratifying the convention, it can claim that the 
provision does not apply. Canada also sought to prevent this right of passage from emerging by 
employing historic title. If the waters had always been Canadian, then obviously no new rights 
could arise. This reasoning is well illustrated in a 1983 response from the federal government to 
a letter written by a citizen interested in the application of this principle to the Arctic. It wrote:
The Canadian position is that these waters have historically been internal waters and that 
the drawing of straight baselines would not change the status of these waters. Thus Article 
8(2) of the LOS Convention does not apply to these waters, and the right of innocent passage 
does not apply to passage through the Arctic Archipelago (quoted in Huebert 1993, 333).
What areas China believes are “subject to [Canadian] jurisdiction” are, therefore, up for debate. 
That ambiguity was certainly the intent, with the waters muddied just enough to allow China 
to skirt the issue, neither locking itself into a recognition of Canadian sovereignty or offending 
a Canadian government that it wants to work with. While Canada would have preferred an 
outright Chinese acceptance of its legal position, this calculated ambiguity is something that 
it can build upon. As this author has argued elsewhere, increased Chinese shipping activity 
in the Northwest Passage could strengthen Canadian sovereignty by securing from Chinese 
companies what Canada could not get from the United States, namely implicit acceptance 
of Canada’s right to regulate and control shipping beyond what accepted international 
law governing territorial waters and international straits would allow (Lajeunesse 2016a; 
Lajeunesse 2016b). This would seem an easy sell for Chinese shipping companies, whose 
objective is safe and efficient transit and not a political battle with Canada. China’s Arctic 
Policy, while not explicitly accepting the Canadian position, opens space for this type of 
implicit agreement.
Here is one of those win-win arrangements. Assistance for Chinese shipping from Canadian ice 
services, weather forecasting and even icebreaker support in exchange for Chinese companies’ 
willingness to obey Canadian regulations, comply with vessel reporting requirements and in 
all actions imply acceptance of Canada’s sovereignty. In an interview with Vice News, Global 
6Affairs Canada spokesperson Adam Austen suggested that such an arrangement would be 
welcomed by Canada, with Austin stating: “Canada welcomes navigation in its Arctic waters 
by vessels from any country, including China, provided that ships comply with Canadian laws 
on safety, security and the protection of the environment” (Arsenault 2018).
In many areas, Chinese co-operation with Canada and the Arctic states offers opportunities for 
productive engagement. The 2017 moratorium on fishing in the Polar Basin is an excellent 
example of long-term multinational planning. China’s rapidly expanding polar scientific 
research program, likewise, has the potential for collaboration and mutual assistance (Chircop 
2011; Lasserre 2010). As recently as 2015, China expressed an interest in establishing a 
research station in the Canadian Arctic and, while a stand-alone station is unlikely to be 
authorized, a partnership with the recently opened Canadian High Arctic Research Station in 
Cambridge Bay, Nunavut would combine Canadian facilities with Chinese resources to mutual 
benefit (Vanderklippe 2015).
Collaboration and partnership with China offers real benefits to both countries, yet it must be 
undertaken with a cautious eye. This paper argues that China will work within the confines of 
international law because that framework offers Beijing what it needs. There is more to it than 
that however. China also accepts this framework because it cannot simply take what it desires. 
Beijing’s flouting of UNCLOS and the authority of the International Court of Justice in the South 
China Sea is clear evidence that it places little stock in international law or adjudication when 
those conflict with its interest, and when its power is sufficient to allow it to ignore those rules.
The implications for Canada are clear. Partnership with China in the Arctic is desirable, 
but it must be on Canadian terms. Any such activity must depend upon Canadian support 
and resources. In practice, this means real Canadian investment in northern shipping 
infrastructure, aids to navigation and hydrographic surveying. That the Chinese icebreaker Xue 
Long was reported to be undertaking hydrographic charting in the Northwest Passage in 2017 
(Vanderklippe 2017) is concerning — not because the ship was acting inappropriately, but 
because it was emblematic of Canada’s failure to adequately chart the route itself.7 Canadian 
services will also be important. Weather forecasting, ice reporting and emergency ice-breaking 
support must be made available and, crucially, be provided exclusively by Canada. Reliance on 
Canadian services and support infrastructure incentivizes compliance with Canadian laws and 
regulations and provides a real lever to ensure operations remain on Canadian terms. 
Conversely, the absence of such support may incentivize either the Chinese state or state-
owned shipping companies to build their own escort icebreakers or develop Chinese satellite-
based ice-forecasting services, usurping roles that should be performed by Canada within its 
sovereign territory. Failure to provide that Canadian support also risks putting the Chinese state 
and shipping companies into a position where they may question the need to comply with the 
sometimes cumbersome reporting requirements and environmental regulations demanded by 
Canada within its internal waters. If Chinese companies see no advantage to working within the 
Canadian system, they may simply start to treat the Northwest Passage as an international 
strait, in which Canadian control is nominal at best.
Enforcing Canadian jurisdiction and exercising control will largely be an exercise in soft 
power. Chinese resource companies will work with Canada on Ottawa’s terms because there 
7 Canada is pursuing this through the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors Initiative, a multi-year project to map safe 
shipping corridors through the most heavily used areas of the Northwest Passage.
7is no other immediate alternative. State policy for Chinese ships operating in the North is to 
obey all coastal state laws and regulations and that is unlikely to change (Lajeunesse 2016a). 
Compliance and respect for Canadian sovereignty and control will be driven by necessity and 
convenience. 
Control must also be backstopped by hard-power assets, to force compliance in worst-case 
scenarios. Canada is preparing this capacity with six Arctic Offshore and Patrol Ships 
(AOPS), now in various stages of construction in Halifax. The Harry DeWolf class will 
provide Canada with a capable, multi-mission platform. Carrying RCMP and Environment 
Canada officers, the ships will serve a constabulary function while simultaneously providing 
some of the emergency-support and disaster-response capability that will become increasingly 
necessary as more ships ply the northern waters. The Department of National Defence’s 
recently released white paper, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” also offers promising commitments 
in situational awareness (DND 2017, 39), while Defence Research and Development Canada 
is spending millions on new monitoring technology for the Arctic waters (Thompson 2017; 
DRDC 2018).
Proper enforcement capacity is a requirement not simply in anticipation of increased Chinese 
activity, but in preparation for a more open Arctic generally. Thankfully, the Arctic is unlikely 
to emerge as a region of conflict (Lackenbauer 2009; Lasserre et. al. 2012) and Canadian-
Chinese interactions in the North will likely be governed by well-defined legal frameworks. 
This is the underlying message of China’s Arctic Policy, which foresees an Arctic future based 
on collaboration and mutual respect. This is a vision that Canada should be able to live with 
and embrace. In part, because China is correct in asserting that it (and other non-Arctic states) 
have certain rights in the Far North and because Canada can leverage Chinese resources, 
interest and even presence in the region to reinforce its own legal and political positions, 
while financing badly needed infrastructure and development projects. Like it or not, China 
considers itself a “Near Arctic State.” Canada should make sure that working with China 
really is “win-win.”
8REFERENCES
“Trying to Pull Together.” The Economist, April 20, 2011.
Arsenault, Chris. “Canada Welcomes China’s Plan to Build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ in the Arctic.” Vice 
News, February 1, 2018.
Brady, Ann-Marie. 2017. China as a Great Polar Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Canada. 2017. Strong, Secure, Engaged. Ottawa: Department of National Defence.
______ 2017a. “National Trade Corridors Fund: Applicant’s Guide.”
______ 2018. “Canadian Freight Analysis Framework.” Accessed May 14, 2018, http://www5.
statcan.gc.ca/olc-cel/olc.action?objId=50-503-X&objType=2&lang=en&limit=0.
Canada and United States. 1988. Arctic Cooperation Agreement. Ottawa.
CBC Radio. “Critics Fear China’s Foray into Northwest Passage endangers Arctic Sovereignty,” 
September 15, 2017.
Chircop, Aldo. 2011. “The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State.” Canadian Naval Review 
7(1): 9-14.
Connelly, Heather. 2018. China’s Arctic Dream. Washington: CSIS Europe Program.
Defence Research and Development Canada. “All Domain Situational Awareness S&T Program.” 
Modified February 12, 2018, accessed March 29, 2018, http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/en/partnerships-
partenariats/all-domain-situational-awareness-connaisssance-situation-domaines.page.
Dobson, Wendy. 2017. “China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Canada’s Foreign Direct Investment 
Policy.” Canadian Public Policy 43(2): 29-44.
Fife, Robert and Steven Chase. “Chinese Ship Making First Voyage through Canada’s Northwest 
Passage,” The Globe and Mail, August 31, 2017.
Germany. 2013. Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines. Berlin: Federal Foreign Office. 
Huebert, Rob. 1993. Steel, Ice and Decision-Making: The Voyage of the Polar Sea and its Aftermath: 
The Making of Canadian Northern Foreign Policy, PhD diss, Dalhousie University.
Human Rights Watch. 2018. World Report 2018. 
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre. 2018. China’s 
Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and James Manicom. 2014. “Canada’s Northern Strategy and East 
Asian States’ Interests in the Arctic.” In East-Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and 
International Politics. Edited by Ken Coates and Kimie Hara. Waterloo: Centre for International 
Governance Innovation: 78-117.
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2009. “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada 
and the Circumpolar World.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow 3. Toronto: CIC. 
9______ 2014. “Canada and the Asian Observers to the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity.” 
Asia Policy 18(1): 22-29.
______ 2014. East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics 5. 
Waterloo: CIGI.
Lajeunesse, Adam and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. 2016. “Chinese Mining Interests and the Arctic.” 
In Governing the North American Arctic. Edited by Dawn Alexandrea Berry, Nigel Bowles, and 
Halbert Jones. New York: Palgrave McMillan: 74-99.
Lajeunesse, Adam. 2016a. “Chinese Prepare to use the Northwest Passage.” World Policy Institute.
______ 2016b. Lock, Stock, and Icebergs: The Evolution of Canada’s Arctic Maritime Sovereignty. 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Lasserre, Frédéric. 2010. “China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation Potential for Canada?”  
China Papers 11. Vancouver: CIC.
Lasserre, Frédéric, Jérome Le Roy, and Richard Garon. 2012. “Is There an Arms Race in the 
Arctic?” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14(3-4): 1-56.
MacDonald, Adam. 2018. “Ottawa Should be Wary of China’s Visions for the Arctic.” MLI  
Inside Policy.
Mining Association of Canada et. al. 2015. Levelling the Playing Field; Supporting Mineral 
Exploration and Mining in Remote and Northern Canada.
Pharand, Donat. 2006. “Legal Opinion on the Northwest Passage.” In Managing Turmoil: An 
Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Ottawa: 
Canadian Senate.
Polar Initiative. 2018. “The Polar Silk Road: China’s Arctic Ambitions.” Washington: Kissinger 
Institute on China and the United States.
Robinson, Roger. 2013. “China’s ‘Long Con’ in the Arctic.” Macdonald-Laurier Institute 
Commentary.
Ruffilli, Dean. 2011. Arctic Marine and Intermodal Infrastructure: Challenges and the Government 
of Canada’s Response. Ottawa: Industry, Infrastructure and Resources Division, Parliamentary 
Information and Research Services. 
Schultz, Kai. “Sri Lanka, Struggling with Debt, Hands a Major Port to China.” The New York 
Times, December 12, 2017.
Sevunts, Levon. “China’s Arctic Road and Belt Gambit.” Eye on the Arctic, October 2, 2017.
Thomson, Jimmy. 2017. “Canadian Military Developing Surveillance System to Monitor Arctic 
Waters.” CBC News, August 2, 2017.
______ 2018. “What does China’s new Arctic Policy mean for Canada.” CBC News, January 27, 2018.
United Nations. 1983. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
United States. 2013. Arctic Strategy. Washington: Department of Defense. 
10
______ 2013a. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Washington: White House.
Vanderklippe, Nathan. 2015. “Chinese Scientists Look to Canadian Arctic for Research Outpost.” 
Globe and Mail, March 18, 2015 — updated March 25, 2017.
______ 2017. “As Ice Levels Recede, China Eyes Shipping opportunities in Canada’s Northwest 
Passage.” Globe and Mail, November 14, 2017.
World Air Quality Index Project. 2018. Air Pollution in China: Real-Time Air Quality Index Visual 
Map. Accessed March 23, 2018, http://aqicn.org/map/china/#@g/29.3156/116.6748/4z.
Zang, Ming. 2015. “China in the Arctic: Practices and Policies.” Statement by the Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to the 3rd Arctic Circle Assembly, Reykjavik, Iceland.
11
About the Author
Adam Lajeunesse, PhD, is the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Canadian Arctic Marine Security Policy and an Assistant 
Professor at the Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University. He is the author of Lock, Stock, and 
Icebergs (2016), a political history of the Northwest Passage, as well as co-author of the 2017 monograph China’s 
Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada, and co-editor of Canadian Arctic Operations, 1941-2015: Lessons 
Learned, Lost, and Relearned (2017). Lajeunesse works on questions of Arctic sovereignty and security policy and 
has written extensively on CAF Arctic operations, maritime security, Canadian-American cooperation in the North, 
and Canadian Arctic history. 
Dr. Lajeunesse is a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, the Arctic Institute of North America, and the 
Centre for the Study of Security and Development and sits on the editorial board of the Canadian Naval Review. 
He is a regular lecturer at the NATO Defence College (Rome) and an academic participant in the bi-annual Arctic 
Security Working Group.
12
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
The School of Public Policy has become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and 
focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy 
and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada. 
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance 
for the betterment of our families, communities and country. We do this by: 
• Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, 
giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital 
interests both here and abroad;
• Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building 
a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday 
Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures;
• Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community 
outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit 
all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
The School of Public Policy relies on industry experts and practitioners, as well as academics, to conduct research in their 
areas of expertise. Using experts and practitioners is what makes our research especially relevant and applicable. Authors 
may produce research in an area which they have a personal or professional stake. That is why The School subjects all 
Research Papers to a double anonymous peer review. Then, once reviewers comments have been reflected, the work is 
reviewed again by one of our Scientific Directors to ensure the accuracy and validity of analysis and data.
The School of Public Policy
University of Calgary, Downtown Campus
906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor
Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9
Phone: 403 210 3802
DISTRIBUTION
Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and 
therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, 
or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright © Lajeunesse 2018. This is an open-access paper distributed 
under the terms of the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC 4.0, which 
allows non-commercial sharing and redistribution so long as the original 
author and publisher are credited.
ISSN
ISSN 2560-8312 The School of Public Policy Publications (Print) 
ISSN 2560-8320 The School of Public Policy Publications (Online)
DATE OF ISSUE
December 2018
MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION
For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-220-2540. 
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about  
The School's events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT
For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please 
contact Sharon deBoer-Fyie by telephone at 403-220-4624 or by e-mail 
at sharon.deboerfyie@ucalgary.ca.
13
RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE HOLIDAYS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Social-Policy-Trends-Domestic-Violence-December-2018-Ritas-Edits.pdf
Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins | December 2018
THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA: A BACKGROUNDER
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Telecommunications-Fellows-Khanal.pdf
G. Kent Fellows and Mukesh Khanal | December 2018
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN ALBERTA
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Social-Policy-Trends-UR-Duration-November-2018.pdf
Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins | November 2018
ALBERTA’S LONG-TERM FISCAL FUTURE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/AB-Fiscal-Future-Tombe.pdf
Trevor Tombe | November 2018
THE PROS AND CONS OF CARBON TAXES AND CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEMS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Carbon-Pricing-Wood.pdf
Joel Wood | November 2018
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TRENDS: CARBON REBATES UNLIKELY TO UNDERMINE INCENTIVES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Energy-Prices-and-Rebates-EEP-Trends-Nov-2018.pdf
G. Kent Fellows, Trevor Tombe and Brendan Boyd | November 2018
HOUSING, HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Homelessness-Kneebone.pdf
Ronald Kneebone | November 2018
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: MONTHLY RENT PAYMENTS IN THE TWENTY LARGEST CANADIAN CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS (2017)
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Social-Policy-Trends-Canada-Rents-October-2018.pdf
Margarita Wilkins and Ronald Kneebone | October 2018
ASSESSING POLICY SUPPORT FOR EMISSIONS-INTENSIVE AND TRADE-EXPOSED INDUSTRIES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Assessing-EITE-Policy-Winter-Dobson.pdf
Sarah Dobson and Jennifer Winter | October 2018
TAX POLICY TRENDS: CANADIAN POLICY MAKERS CONSIDER RESPONSE TO U.S. TAX OVERHAUL
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Tax-Trends-US-Tax-Overhaul-Mintz-Bazel-Final.pdf
Jack Mintz and Philip Bazel | October 2018
FISCAL POLICY TRENDS: ALBERTA’S GOVERNMENT SPENDING: HOW BIG A PROBLEM?
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Fiscal-Trends-AB-Gov-Spending-McMillan.pdf
Melville McMillan | October 2018
CANADA’S PROGRESSIVE TRADE AGENDA AND A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH CHINA: ARE THEY INCOMPATIBLE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Progressive-Trade-Agenda-Stephens-final.pdf
Hugh Stephens | October 2018
50 YEARS OF GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA BUDGETING
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/50-Years-AB-Budget-Kneebone-Wilkins.pdf
Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins | October 2018
